Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure: Patch Gaps, eBPF Protections, and Water Outage Context (Feb 2026)

TLDR

Act now: 1) Apply Microsoft Office updates from Feb 10, 2026 to reduce enterprise attack surface [3]. 2) Where network switches can’t be patched quickly, deploy eBPF‑agent protections (e.g., Cisco Live Protect) to block exploit behavior until patches are in,,t

Sources highlight two concrete, actionable areas: immediate Office patching (Feb 10, 2026 updates) and interim eBPF‑agent defenses for unpatched network switches. Separate reporting flags widespread, prolonged water outages as a policy focus, but provides no evidence of cyber causation. No ransomware incidents are att

Evidence snapshot

Network devices: Cisco Live Protect uses an eBPF agent to detect suspicious behavior on switches with unpatched OS and block exploits pre‑patch [1].
Enterprise apps: Microsoft released Office updates dated Feb 10, 2026, indicating active patch cycles and risk if unpatched [3].
Public utilities: Reporting flags widespread, prolonged water outages as a central national issue; no cyber attribution is provided in that source [2].

Recent incidents (last 6–12 months)

Provided sources do not document specific ransomware events. Operational water outages are noted without cyber linkage [2].

Likely exposure vectors indicated by sources

Unpatched network firmware/OS on switches, creating windows for exploit attempts [1].
Unpatched Office components in enterprise environments [3].

Operator actions (practical, verifiable)

Patch management: Prioritize deploying the Feb 10, 2026 Microsoft Office updates across fleets; verify installation and address stragglers [3].
Pre‑patch protection on network gear: Where immediate firmware fixes are not possible, use agent‑based eBPF controls (e.g., Cisco Live Protect) to block exploit behavior until patched [1].
Continuity readiness: Given reported prolonged water outages (no cyber cause stated), validate contingency plans and monitoring for water infrastructure operations [2].

Confidence/uncertainty

No direct evidence in these sources of active ransomware against utilities; outage reporting is non‑attributed and policy‑focused [2].